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What a performance: performance related pay in the public services

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  • Marsden, David
  • French, Stephen

Abstract

Linking pay to performance is something employers increasingly seek to achieve. This was once seen as an objective which could only be met in the private sector. That is no longer true. In the 1990s the British public services have experienced a revolution which has attracted the interest and concern of public service managers and unions around the world. The days when government officials marched in step up incremental pay scales are gone. Virtually all civil servants are now subject to new forms of performance management, or performance pay. This approach now extends to many other areas of the public services. But are these new systems of financial reward as effective as their creators had hoped? This is one of the questions which prompted the substantial programme of research carried out by David Marsden and Stephen French under the auspices of the Industrial Relations programme of the Centre for Economic Performance (with financial assistance from the Anglo-German Foundation). It is the most extensive study of its kind, looking at performance pay systems in the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service; within the NHS; and in the teaching profession.

Suggested Citation

  • Marsden, David & French, Stephen, 1998. "What a performance: performance related pay in the public services," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4421, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:4421
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/4421/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marsden, David & Richardson, Ray, 1992. "Motivation and performance related pay in the public sector: a case study of the Inland Revenue," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3647, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    3. Dale Ballou & Michael Podgursky, 1993. "Teachers' Attitudes toward Merit Pay: Examining Conventional Wisdom," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(1), pages 50-61, October.
    4. David Marsden & Ray Richardson, 1994. "Performing for Pay? The Effects of ‘Merit Pay’ on Motivation in a Public Service," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 243-261, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Marsden, 2004. "The Role of Performance-Related Pay in Renegotiating the “Effort Bargain†: The Case of the British Public Service," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 57(3), pages 350-370, April.
    2. Atkinson, Adele & Burgess, Simon & Croxson, Bronwyn & Gregg, Paul & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2009. "Evaluating the impact of performance-related pay for teachers in England," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 251-261, June.
    3. Marsden, David, 2004. "The role of performance-related pay in renegotiating the "effort bargain": the case of the British public service," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4036, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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