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The more we know, the less we agree: public announcements and higher-order expectations

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  • Kondor, Peter

Abstract

The stylized fact that public announcements in financial markets are followed by intense trading, high trading volume and volatile prices, is widely perceived as the sign of increasing disagreement due to the announcement. However, it is common to argue that this would be inconsistent with Bayesian-learning and common priors. In this paper, we not only show that — with certain information structures — increasing disagreement is possible in a Bayesian model, but we also argue that with the assumption that traders trade for resale — so they try to second guess future traders’ guesses — there are information structures which are simple, intuitive and plausible and result in increasing disagreement even in a standard, multi-period Grossman—Stiglitz model.

Suggested Citation

  • Kondor, Peter, 2004. "The more we know, the less we agree: public announcements and higher-order expectations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24645, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:24645
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
    2. Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, 2012. "Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 539-580.
    3. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
    4. András Simonovits, 2006. "Social Security Reform in the US: Lessons from Hungary," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0602, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 24 Apr 2006.
    5. Iván Major, 2006. "Why do (or do not) banks share customer information? A comparison of mature private credit markets and markets in transition," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0603, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, revised 24 Apr 2006.
    6. Kathryn M. E. Dominguez & Freyan Panthaki, 2007. "The influence of actual and unrequited interventions," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 171-200.
    7. Baeriswyl, Romain, 2007. "Central Bank's Action and Communication," Discussion Papers in Economics 1381, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Confirmatory bias; Public announcements; Trading volume; Higher-order expectations; Short-term traders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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