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Who's got the power? Wage determination and its resilience in the Great Recession

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  • de Almeida Vilares, Hugo
  • Reis, Hugo

Abstract

Whereas wage inequality has risen markedly in most OECD countries in recent decades, it has fallen in several Southern European economies. To shed light on this phenomenon, we embed sectoral bargaining, which is common in Southern European economies, in a dynamic search and matching model. We estimate the model using comprehensive employer-employee data from Portugal for the last two decades and its data on collective bargaining agreements in different sectors, which allows us to assess the evolution of rent sharing. We find that since the mid-2000s, worker bargaining power has grown slightly at the bottom of the skill distribution while shrinking at the middle and top, contributing to the compression of the wage distribution. These changes, which persisted even during the Great Recession, increased the importance of sectoral bargaining in wage determination, weakened the relationship between wages and firm productivity, and reduced the assortative matching of workers to firms.

Suggested Citation

  • de Almeida Vilares, Hugo & Reis, Hugo, 2022. "Who's got the power? Wage determination and its resilience in the Great Recession," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118036, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118036
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118036/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre Cahuc & François Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A theory of wages and labor demand with intra-firm bargaining and matching frictions," SciencePo Working papers hal-03415795, HAL.
    2. David Card & Francesco Devicienti & Agata Maida, 2014. "Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(1), pages 84-111.
    3. Pierre Cahuc & Francois Marque & Etienne Wasmer, 2008. "A Theory Of Wages And Labor Demand With Intra-Firm Bargaining And Matching Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 943-972, August.
    4. Thibaut Lamadon & Elena Manresa & Stephane Bonhomme, 2016. "Discretizing Unobserved Heterogeneity," 2016 Meeting Papers 1536, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2012. "Recursive Macroeconomic Theory, Third Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 3, volume 1, number 0262018748, April.
    6. Giuseppe Bertola & Ricardo J. Caballero, 1994. "Cross-Sectional Efficiency and Labour Hoarding in a Matching Model of Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 435-456.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    search and matching; wage determination; collective bargaining and trade unions; rent sharing; bargaining power; assortative matching; wage inequality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C50 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - General
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence

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