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Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving

Author

Listed:
  • Dean Karlan

    (Economic Growth Center, Yale University)

  • Margaret A. McConnell

    (Harvard School of Public Health)

Abstract

Theories abound for why individuals give to charity. We conduct a field experiment with donors to a Yale University service club to test the impact of a promise of public recognition on giving. Some may claim that they respond to an offer of public recognition not to improve their social standing, but rather to motivate others to give. To tease apart these two theories,we conduct a laboratory experiment with undergraduates, and found no evidence to support the alternative, altruistic motivation. We conclude that charitable gifts increase in response to the promise of public recognition primarily because of individuals' desire to improve their social image.

Suggested Citation

  • Dean Karlan & Margaret A. McConnell, 2012. "Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving," Working Papers 1006, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:egc:wpaper:1006
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    File URL: http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp1006.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    endowments; prosocial behavior; experiments; voluntary contributions; social image;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General

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