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Rendimiento Escolar y Premios por Desempeño. La Experiencia Latinoamericana (Scholastic performance and performance awards)

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  • Alejandra Mizala
  • Pilar Romaguera

Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo es discutir analítica y metodológicamente la evaluación del desempeño y la introducción de incentivos en educación en América Latina. Los incentivos permiten remunerar más adecuadamente a los docentes y por esa vía motivar una mejora en su desempeño y por ende en la calidad de la educación que se imparte. Asimismo, la evaluación del desempeño y la entrega de incentivos están asociados con una mejora en la información disponible y el fortalecimiento de la rendición de cuentas en el sistema educacional. Los distintos casos analizados permiten concluir que los esquemas de evaluaciones a nivel de establecimientos escolares y premios colectivos son aquellas que se adaptan mejor a las características de proceso educativo y potencian elementos vitales en este proceso como el trabajo en equipo. Las evaluaciones individuales presentan mayores dificultades. Asimismo, se concluye que es necesario incluir con más fuerza en las evaluaciones los resultados educativos, que es finalmente lo que se busca mejorar. Una parte significativa de los sistemas de incentivos actualmente aplicados enfatizan insumos educativos, y en algunos casos principalmente el cumplimiento de normas. En la medida que los factores considerados en la evaluación del desempeño no estén altamente correlacionados con el logro educativo, los incentivos se desvanecen. De allí la importancia de enfatizar los resultados y de asegurarse que si se incluyen indicadores de insumos y procesos éstos estén alineados con el logro educativo.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandra Mizala & Pilar Romaguera, 2003. "Rendimiento Escolar y Premios por Desempeño. La Experiencia Latinoamericana (Scholastic performance and performance awards)," Documentos de Trabajo 157, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:157
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    References listed on IDEAS

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