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Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?

Author

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  • Jiang, Erica Xuewei

    (U of Southern California)

  • Matvos, Gregor

    (Northwestern U)

  • Piskorski, Tomasz

    (Columbia U)

  • Seru, Amit

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

We analyze U.S. banks’ asset exposure to a recent rise in the interest rates with implications for financial stability. The U.S. banking system’s market value of assets is $2 trillion lower than suggested by their book value of assets accounting for loan portfolios held to maturity. Marked-to-market bank assets have declined by an average of 10% across all the banks, with the bottom 5th percentile experiencing a decline of 20%. We illustrate that uninsured leverage (i.e., Uninsured Debt/Assets) is the key to understanding whether these losses would lead to some banks in the U.S. becoming insolvent-- unlike insured depositors, uninsured depositors stand to lose a part of their deposits if the bank fails, potentially giving them incentives to run. A case study of the recently failed Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is illustrative. 10 percent of banks have larger unrecognized losses than those at SVB. Nor was SVB the worst capitalized bank, with 10 percent of banks having lower capitalization than SVB. On the other hand, SVB had a disproportional share of uninsured funding: only 1 percent of banks had higher uninsured leverage. Combined, losses and uninsured leverage provide incentives for an SVB uninsured depositor run. We compute similar incentives for the sample of all U.S. banks. Even if only half of uninsured depositors decide to withdraw, almost 190 banks are at a potential risk of impairment to insured depositors, with potentially $300 billion of insured deposits at risk. If uninsured deposit withdrawals cause even small fire sales, substantially more banks are at risk. Overall, these calculations suggest that recent declines in bank asset values very significantly increased the fragility of the US banking system to uninsured depositor runs.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiang, Erica Xuewei & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2023. "Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?," Research Papers 4080, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:4080
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Raymond Kim, 2024. "Hedging securities and Silicon Valley Bank idiosyncrasies," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 653-672, April.
    4. Axelle Arquié, 2023. "Fire Sales and Bank Runs in the Presence of a Saving Allocation by Depositors," Working Papers 2023-09, CEPII research center.
    5. Citterio, Alberto, 2024. "Bank failure prediction models: Review and outlook," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    6. Sarmiento Paipilla, Miguel, 2024. "The Transmission of Non-Banking Liquidity Shocks to the Banking Sector," Discussion Paper 2024-011, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Jianglin Dennis Ding & George G. Pennacchi, 2024. "The effects of social media use by bank depositors," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 289-300, September.
    8. Maximilian Grimm, 2024. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Systemic Bank Funding Stability," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 341, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    9. Sergio A. Correia & Stephan Luck & Emil Verner, 2024. "Failing Banks," Staff Reports 1117, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. David P. Glancy & Felicia Ionescu & Elizabeth C. Klee & Antonis Kotidis & Michael Siemer & Andrei Zlate, 2024. "The 2023 Banking Turmoil and the Bank Term Funding Program," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2024-045, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Marco Cipriani & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Anna Kovner, 2024. "Tracing Bank Runs in Real Time," Staff Reports 1104, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    12. Wifo, 2023. "WIFO-Monatsberichte, Heft 4/2023," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 96(4), April.
    13. Giampaolo Bonomi & Ali Uppal, 2023. "Kites and Quails: Monetary Policy and Communication with Strategic Financial Markets," Papers 2305.08958, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    14. Koont, Naz & Santos, Tano & Zingales, Luigi, 2023. "Destabilizing digital "bank walks"," Working Papers 328, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    15. Julia Fonseca & Lu Liu, 2024. "Mortgage Lock‐In, Mobility, and Labor Reallocation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3729-3772, December.
    16. Thomas Url, 2023. "Hohe Inflation führt zu Kurswechsel in der Geldpolitik," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 96(4), pages 269-281, April.
    17. Lyócsa, Štefan & Halousková, Martina & Haugom, Erik, 2023. "The US banking crisis in 2023: Intraday attention and price variation of banks at risk," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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