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The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact

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  • Nerlich, Carolin
  • Reuter, Wolf Heinrich

Abstract

This study analyses the link between fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact. We look at different features of national numerical fiscal rules in combination with fiscal councils and medium-term budgeting frameworks. We construct our own time-varying dataset for national fiscal frameworks for the period 1990-2012 covering all 27 EU Member States and estimate a dynamic panel on aggregate and disaggregated fiscal policy variables. We find strong support that numerical fiscal rules help to improve the primary balance, and that the budgetary impact can be further strengthened when supported by independent fiscal councils and an effective medium-term budgeting framework. JEL Classification: E61, E62, H60

Suggested Citation

  • Nerlich, Carolin & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2013. "The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact," Working Paper Series 1588, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20131588
    Note: 508107
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal council; fiscal framework; fiscal policy; fiscal rules; medium term budgeting framework;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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