Approval voting and arrow's impossibility theorem
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- François Maniquet & Philippe Mongin, 2015. "Approval voting and Arrow’s impossibility theorem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 519-532, March.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Norihisa Sato, 2014. "A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 809-825, December.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2008.
"Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 151-162, June.
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- K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2011. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
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- Marc Vorsatz, 2007.
"Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Yongsheng Xu, 2010. "Axiomatizations of Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 91-102, Springer.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
- Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on Approval Voting," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-02839-7, December.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2020.
"Approval voting and Shapley ranking,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(3), pages 415-428, September.
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2018. "Approval Voting and Shapley Ranking," Working Papers ECARES 2018-09, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2019. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," Working Papers of BETA 2019-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- DEHEZ Pierre, & GINSBURGH Victor,, 2018. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2018012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pierre Dehez & Victor Ginsburgh, 2019. "Approval voting and Shapley ranking," LIDAM Reprints CORE 3073, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Aleksandras KRYLOVAS & Natalja KOSAREVA & Edmundas Kazimieras ZAVADSKAS, 2016. "Statistical Analysis of KEMIRA Type Weights Balancing Methods," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(3), pages 19-39, September.
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
- Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017.
"Evaluationwise strategy-proofness,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
- Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver & Shin Sato, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Post-Print hal-02517255, HAL.
- Guy Barokas & Yves Sprumont, 2022. "The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 187-199, January.
- Sato, Norihisa, 2019. "Approval voting and fixed electorate with dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 51-60.
- Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
- Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019.
"A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption,"
Working Papers
1938, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers halshs-02440615, HAL.
- Conal Duddy & Ashley Piggins & William Zwicker, 2016.
"Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 301-333, February.
- Duddy, Conal & Piggins, Ashley & Zwicker, William, 2014. "Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach," MPRA Paper 62071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt, 2020. "Arrovian Aggregation of Convex Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 799-844, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
approval voting; majority voting; collective prefer- ence function; arrow’s impossibility theorem.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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