The informational basis of scoring rules
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0176-7
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Cited by:
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"A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption,"
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- Federica Ceron & Stéphane Gonzalez, 2019. "A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption," Working Papers 1938, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jac C. Heckelman, 2023. "Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 125-132, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
Scoring rules; May’s theorem; Informational basis; D71;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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