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Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Author

Listed:
  • Robin Mason

    (University of Southampton)

  • Akos Valentinyi

    (University of Southampton)

Abstract

This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to recent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a player’s signal is sufficiently uninformative of the signals of its opponents (in the sense of the Fisher information of the signal), then the player’s best response to any strategy profile of its opponents is non-decreasing in its signal. Secondly, a contraction mapping argument shows that sufficient heterogeneity ensures that equilibrium is unique.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Mason & Akos Valentinyi, 2003. "Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0303, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0303
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    File URL: http://econ.core.hu/doc/dp/dp/mtdp0303.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Stephen Morris, "undated". "Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching," Penn CARESS Working Papers 1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2, Penn Economics Department.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Co-ordination; Interaction games; Heterogeneity; Unique equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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