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Content
1999
1998
- 9808 An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection
by Ania, A.B. & Troger, T. & Wambach, A.
- 9807 Individual Randomness in Economic Models with a Continuum Agents
by Alos-Ferrer, C.
- 9805 Optimal Incentives to Reduce Downstream Pollution Under Asymmetric Information
by Kerschbamer, R. & Maderner, N.
- 9804 Product Differentiation and Market Power
by Dierker, E. & Dierker, H.
- 9803 Dividends and Agency Costs
by Gugler, K.
- 9801 Dynamic Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents
by Alos-Ferrer, C.
1992
1991
- 166 The Role of Private Information in the Sunk Cost Phenomenon
by Berg, J. & Dickhaut, J.W. & Kanodia, C.
- 159 Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes
by Ladha, K.K.
- 158 Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem
by Ladha, K.K. & Miller, G.
- 157 Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-Rule Voting with Correlated Votes
by Ladha, K.K.
- 156 Institutionally-Derived Stability: Cores in Two- Dimensional Voting Games
by Eavy, C.L. & Miller, G.J.
- 155 The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech and Correlated Votes
by Ladha, K.K.
- 154 Early Republican Retirement: A Cause of Democratic Dominance in the House of Representatives
by Gilmour, J.B. & Rothstein, P.
- 153 Abnormal Politics: Possibilities for Presidential Leadership
by Miller, G.J.
- 152 The Dynamics of a Stable Cartel: The Express 1851-1913
by Grossman,P.Z.
- 148 Why Do Employers Only Reward Extreme Performance? Evidence And Expalnations Of Zig-Zagging Relationships Among Performance, Pay,And Turnover
by Zenger, T.R.
1990
- 147 The Pivotal Role of the Judiciary in the Deregulation Battle Between the Executive and Legislature
by Ladha, K.K.
- 146 The Political Economy of Changing Property Rights: Dismantling a Kenyan Commons
by Ensminger, J. & Rutten, A.
- 145 Understanding Organizational Diseconomies of Scale: Small Firm Advantages in Resolving Agency Problems in R&D
by Zenger, T.R.
- 144 A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics
by North, D.C.
- 143 Agency Problems And Structural Arrangements Within International Economic Organizations: The Case Of The World Bank
by Gauthier, B.
- 142 Revisionist Tarriff History And The Theory Of Hegemonic Stability
by Nye, J.V.
- 141 Negligence Versus Strict Liability Regimes In Auditing: An Experimental Investigation
by Dopuch, N. & King, R.R.
- 140 The Tragicomedy Of The Commons: Why Communities Rationally Choose "Infficient" Allocations Os Shared Resources
by Roberts, R.D.
- 139 Factor Proportions, Public Finances, And Property Rights On Labor Resources: A Test And Reformulation Of Domar'S Hypothesis On Slavery Or Serfdom
by Pastore, M.H.
- 138 Hierarchies And Delegation: Sequential Production And Process In An Organizational Setting
by Gauthier, B.
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