A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
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Cited by:
- Milyo, Jeffrey, 2000.
"A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 179-182, February.
- Jeffrey Milyo, 1999. "A Problem with Euclidean Preferences in Spatial Models of Politics," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9920, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Karl Widerquist, 2000.
"The Public Commodities Problem,"
Macroeconomics
0004046, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Karl Widerquist, 2000. "The Public Commodities Problem," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_299, Levy Economics Institute.
- Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Why so much stability? An optimistic view of the possibility of rational legislative decisionmaking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 3-19, March.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006.
"Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 207-216, September.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2004. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences : The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2004-07, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," DULBEA Working Papers 06-05.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8364, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
- Thomas. J. Nechyba, 1997.
"Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(2), pages 277-304.
- Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996. "Existence of Equilibrium and Stratification in Local and Hierarchical Tiebout Economies with Property Taxes and Voting," NBER Technical Working Papers 0190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel F Spulber, 2019. "Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(619), pages 1477-1509.
- Kenneth Shepsle, 1986. "The positive theory of legislative institutions: an enrichment of social choice and spatial models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 135-178, January.
- Randall Holcombe, 1989. "The median voter model in public choice theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 115-125, May.
- Jeffrey Weiss, 1988. "Is vote-selling desirable?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 177-194, November.
- Frank Milne, 1981. "The firm's objective function as a collective choice problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 473-486, January.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1982. "The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years After Tiebout: A Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, 2000. "A Problem with Referendums," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(1), pages 5-31, January.
- Allan Feldman, 1985. "A model of majority voting and growth in government expenditure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 3-17, January.
- Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
- Robert Mackay & Carolyn Weaver, 1981. "Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 447-472, January.
- Henning, Christian H.C.A., 1999. "MODELLIERUNG VON "POLICY OUTPUT" UND "INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE" IN INTERNATIONALEN UMWELTREGIMEN: Ein Einfaches Polit-Okonomisches Gleichgewichtsmodel," Working Paper Series 24402, University of Kiel, Chair of Agricultural Policy.
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