Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences
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Cited by:
- Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer & Xu Tan, 2023. "A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 1-43, February.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Aug 2020.
- Hallman, Alice & Spiro, Daniel, 2023.
"A theory of hypocrisy,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 401-410.
- Alice Hallman & Daniel Spiro, 2022. "A Theory of Hypocrisy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9734, CESifo.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2021.
"Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation [Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model],"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1981-2021.
- Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2019. "Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation," ISER Discussion Paper 1060r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Aug 2020.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2020-12-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2020-12-14 (Microeconomics)
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