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Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions

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  • Schottmüller, Christoph

Abstract

The single-crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility. If single crossing is violated, global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account. This paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one-time violation of single crossing.

Suggested Citation

  • Schottmüller, Christoph, 2015. "Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 127-164.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:158:y:2015:i:pa:p:127-164
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Kerkkamp, R.B.O. & van den Heuvel, W. & Wagelmans, A.P.M., 2018. "Two-echelon supply chain coordination under information asymmetry with multiple types," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 137-159.
    2. Figueroa, Nicolás & Guadalupi, Carla, 2023. "Signaling through tests," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 25-34.
    3. Pishchulov, Grigory & Richter, Knut, 2016. "Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 253(3), pages 711-733.
    4. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 317-328.
    5. Chia‐Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2022. "Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1225-1260, May.
    6. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida & Wing Suen, 2020. "Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences," ISER Discussion Paper 1103r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Spence–Mirrlees condition; Global incentive compatibility; Screening;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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