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Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production

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  • Itoh, H.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine how tasks should be allocated in a simple hierarchy consisting of an organizational designer and subordinates, in the framework of a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard.

Suggested Citation

  • Itoh, H., 1996. "Job Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production," ISER Discussion Paper 0403, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0403
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demski, Js & Sappington, Dem, 1993. "Sourcing With Unverifiable Performance Information," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 1-20.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    3. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    4. Melumad, Nd & Reichelstein, S, 1987. "Centralization Versus Delegation And The Value Of Communication," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25, pages 1-21.
    5. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-345, April.
    6. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-1753, November.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    8. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee, 1989. "Delegation as Commitment: The Case of Income Tax Audits," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 139-163, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gürtler, Oliver, 2005. "On Delegation under Relational Contracts," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 32/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    2. Kragl, Jenny & Schöttner, Anja, 2011. "Wage floors and optimal job design," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 01/2011, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    3. Emma Hubert, 2023. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 605-661, July.
    4. Jenny Kragl & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, And Optimal Job Design," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(2), pages 525-550, May.
    5. Emma Hubert, 2020. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Papers 2007.10758, arXiv.org.
    6. Akifumi Ishihara, 2020. "On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 693-736, December.
    7. Schöttner, Anja, 2005. "Relational contracts and job design," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2005-052, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    8. Aditya U. Kulkarni & Christian Wernz, 2020. "Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 307-329, May.
    9. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2005-052 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2010. "Effort Observability, Incentive Systems, and Organizational Forms," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 24(3), pages 221-237, September.
    11. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Task assignment, incentives and technological factors," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 43-55.
    12. Oliver Gurtler, 2007. "Performance Measurement Technologies and the Trade-off of Risk and Incentives," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 6(1), pages 1-10, April.
    13. Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 1994. "La mise en vigueur des politiques environnementales et l’organisation de la firme," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 211-224, juin.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION; HUMAN RESOURCES; MANPOWER; MANPOWER; MORAL HAZARD;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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