Limited Commitment in Multi†agent Contracting
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DOI: 10.1506/Y677-U574-3466-8122
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- Yinghui Chen & Xiaolin Gong & Chien-Chi Chu & Yang Cao, 2018. "Access to the Internet and Access to Finance: Theory and Evidence," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-38, July.
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