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Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises

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  • Gérard Charreaux

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Si le gouvernement des entreprises fait l'objet de nombreux débats dans les milieux professionnels et politiques, la réflexion théorique sur ce thème reste souvent pauvre et très fragmentaire. L'objectif de cet article est de poser les bases d'une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises. Ce dernier est défini comme l'ensemble des mécanismes qui ont pour effet de délimiter les pouvoirs et d'influencer les décisions des dirigeants, autrement dit, qui "gouvernent" leur conduite et définissent leur espace discrétionnaire. L'article est construit autour de quatre questions fondamentales, visant à proposer une problématique permettant de structurer un programme de recherche dans ce domaine important. (1) Que recouvrent les systèmes de gouvernement des firmes? (2) Comment fonctionnent et évoluent ces systèmes? (3) Quelles sont les qualités d'un système efficace? (4) Existe-t-il un système plus performant?

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Charreaux, 1996. "Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises," Working Papers CREGO 0960501, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0960501
    Note: article publié G. Charreaux, Le gouvernement des entreprises - Corporate Governance: théories et faits, Economica, Janvier 1997, p.421-469.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    gouvernement des entreprises; espace discrétionnaire des dirigeants;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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