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When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?

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  • Brams, Steven J.
  • Mor, Ben D.

Abstract

There are two contending schools of thought on how a victor should treat a defeated party after a war or other major dispute. Whereas magnanimity might quell the desire of the defeated party for revenge, it might also be instrumental in the defeated party's resurrection. Similarly, the defeated party might face the conflicting choices of whether to cooperate or not cooperate with the victor. These interdependent choices are modeled by a generic 2 × 2 “magnanimity game†(MG), which subsumes 12 different specific games that might arise in the aftermath of a war. Rational choices in MG are based on two-sided analysis, in which players can think ahead several moves and take account of each other's preferences. Cycling may or may not be permitted; if it is, which player possesses “moving power†can be critical to the outcome. The analysis is illustrated by historical examples from 19th- and 20th-century wars.
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Suggested Citation

  • Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 1991. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Working Papers 91-27, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:91-27
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
    2. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
    3. Ben D. Mor & Zeev Maoz, 1999. "Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 1-48, February.
    4. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    5. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.
    6. Ben D. Mor, 1995. "Crisis Initiation and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 351-367, July.

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    Keywords

    Stategies ; games ; information;
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