Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting
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DOI: 10.1111/jems.12169
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- Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2016. "Imminent entry and the transition to multimarket rivalry in a laboratory setting," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68888, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5853, CESifo.
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JEL classification:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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