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The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on aggregate unemployment outflows

Author

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  • Van der Linden, Bruno

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

  • Dor, Eric

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); Université catholique de Lille, Faculté Libre des Sciences Economiques, Institut d’Economie Scientifique et de Gestion IESEG, Labores-CNRS)

Abstract

This paper tries to bridge the gap between the theoretical and empirical analyses of the aggregate impacts of labor market policies (LMPs). Contrary to previous empirical studies, we conduct an econometric analysis based on sound theoretical foundations. The specification is based on an equilibrium job search model where LMPs affect tightness on the labor market. The impacts of a comprehensive set of LMPs on the unemployment outflow rate and on wages are jointly estimated. Taking care of the endogeneity of LMPs, our results for Belgium strongly support the implications of the theoretical model. The replacement ratio and the rate of training have a clear-cut negative effect on the exit rate from insured unemployment. The effect of sanctions on this exit rate appears to be rather small.

Suggested Citation

  • Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 1998. "The net effect of unemployment benefits, sanctions and training on aggregate unemployment outflows," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), revised 07 Sep 2000.
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2000020
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2000-20.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cockx, Bart, 1999. "The Design of Active Labour Market Policies. What Matters and What Doesn't ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999035, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    2. Éric Dor & Bruno Van der linden, 2001. "Allocations, sanctions et formations : leur impact sur la formation des salaires et le taux de sortie du chômage," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 117-131.
    3. Michael White and Genevieve Knight, 2003. "Benchmarking the effectiveness of NDYP: A review of European and US literature on the microeconomic effects of labour market programmes for young people," PSI Research Discussion Series 10, Policy Studies Institute, UK.
    4. Van der Linden, Bruno & Dor, Eric, 2001. "Labor Market Policies and Equilibrium Employment : Theory and Application for Belgium," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2001005, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    evaluation; labor market policies; wage bargaining; equilibrium unemployment; matching function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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