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Games of capacities : a (close) look to Nash Equilibria

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Abstract

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Triossi, Matteo, 2007. "Games of capacities : a (close) look to Nash Equilibria," UC3M Working papers. Economics we075933, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we075933
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Romero-Medina & Matteo Triossi, 2021. "Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 105-118, March.
    2. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
    3. Romero-Medina, Antonio & Triossi, Matteo, 2013. "Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 237-239.
    4. Inácio Bó & C.-Philipp Heller, 2017. "Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 545-572, March.
    5. Ehlers, Lars, 2010. "Manipulation via capacities revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 302-311, July.
    6. Hagen, Martin, 2022. "Tradable immigration quotas revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Assaf Romm, 2014. "Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 851-875, December.
    8. Tello Benjamín, 2017. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-9, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stable matchings;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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