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Tradable immigration quotas revisited

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  • Hagen, Martin

Abstract

This paper revisits the theory behind tradable immigration quotas, which have been proposed to raise South-North migration and, specifically, refugee resettlement. We qualify previous research by showing that tradable immigration quotas are generally not utilitarian efficient for host countries. The reason is that global migration entails more complex externalities than other public-good problems, such as environmental protection, where market-based instruments are common. The inefficiency is exacerbated when migrants are matched to countries. Despite these caveats, we offer new results in favor of tradable immigration quotas plus matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Hagen, Martin, 2022. "Tradable immigration quotas revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:208:y:2022:i:c:s0047272722000214
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104619
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    Cited by:

    1. Ohta, Katsunori & Tamura, Yuji, 2023. "Refugee Resettlement," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1237, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    2. Heijmans, Roweno J.R.K. & Engström, Max, 2024. "Time Horizons and Emissions Trading," Discussion Papers 2024/2, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Immigration; Asylum; Tradable quotas; Cap and trade; Matching; Externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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