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On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions

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  • Frutos, María Ángeles de
  • Rosenthal, Robert W.

Abstract

Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Frutos, María Ángeles de & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1997. "On some myths about sequenced common-value auctions," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6023, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:6023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1994. "A Note on Sequential Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 653-657, June.
    2. Rosenthal, Robert W. & Wang, Ruqu, 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 32-55, November.
    3. Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-872, July.
    4. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    5. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    7. Gale, I. & Hausch, D., 1992. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," Working papers 9215, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    8. Kevin Lang & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1991. "The Contractors' Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 329-338, Autumn.
    9. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-1579, September.
    10. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
    11. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    12. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1988. "Reputation in repeated second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-119, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. S. Meij & L.-F. Pau, 2006. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 395-430, May.
      • Meij, S. & Pau, L-F. & van Heck, H.W.G.M., 2003. "Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2003-006-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    2. Wang Tao & Wang Ruqu, 2018. "Limited Liability and High Bids in English Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-12, July.
    3. Rosato, Antonio, 2023. "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    4. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 150-182, February.
    5. Mezzetti, Claudio & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 591-609, March.
    6. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.

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