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Evaluations: Hidden Costs, Questionable Benefits, and Superior Alternatives

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Margit Osterloh

Abstract

Research evaluation is praised as the symbol of modern quality management. We claim firstly, performance evaluations in research have higher costs than normally assumed, because the evaluated persons and institutions systematically change their behavior and develop counter strategies. Moreover, intrinsic work motivation is crowded out and undesired lock-in effects take place. Secondly, the benefits of performance evaluations are questionable. Evaluations provide too little information relevant for decision-making. In addition, they lose importance due to new forms of scientific cooperation on the internet. Thirdly, there exist superior alternatives. They consist in careful selection and supportive process coaching ? and then leave individuals and research institutions to direct themselves.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2006. "Evaluations: Hidden Costs, Questionable Benefits, and Superior Alternatives," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-23, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA), revised Oct 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-23
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    Cited by:

    1. Brenda Cheang & Chongshou Li & Andrew Lim & Zhenzhen Zhang, 2015. "Identifying patterns and structural influences in the scientific communication of business knowledge," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 103(1), pages 159-189, April.
    2. Marcella Corsi & Carlo D'Ippoliti & Federico Lucidi, 2011. "On the Evaluation of Economic Research: The Case of Italy," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 369-402.
    3. Alfred Kieser, 2007. "Entwicklung von Organisationstheorien als Zeitgeistphänomen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 678-705, September.
    4. Wolfram Elsner & Fred Lee, 2010. "Assessing economic research and the future of heterodox economics. Failures and alternatives of journals, departments, and scholars rankings," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 31-41.
    5. Emil Inauen & Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, 2010. "Back to the Future –A Monastic Perspective on Corporate Governance," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 21(1), pages 38-59.
    6. Beckmann, Klaus B., 2011. "Das liberale Trilemma," Working Paper 107/2010, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    7. Vincent Larivière & Rodrigo Costas, 2016. "How Many Is Too Many? On the Relationship between Research Productivity and Impact," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(9), pages 1-10, September.
    8. Maredia, Mywish K., 2009. "Improving the proof: Evolution of and emerging trends in impact assessment methods and approaches in agricultural development," IFPRI discussion papers 929, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    9. Buehling, Kilian, 2021. "Changing research topic trends as an effect of publication rankings – The case of German economists and the Handelsblatt Ranking," Journal of Informetrics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
    10. Beckmann Klaus & Gerrits Carsten, 2009. "Armutsbekämpfung durch Reduktion von Korruption: eine Rolle für Unternehmen? / Fighting poverty by fighting corruption: A task for private enterprise?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 60(1), pages 463-494, January.
    11. Matthias Meyer & Rüdiger W. Waldkirch & Michael A. Zaggl, 2012. "Relative Performance Measurement of Researchers: The Impact of Data Source Selection," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 64(4), pages 308-330, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evaluation; rankings; hidden costs; multi tasking; intrinsic motivation; control theory; selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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