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Grantmaking

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  • Ottaviani, Marco

Abstract

The paper develops a foundational model of the decentralized allocation of subsidies through competitive grantmaking. Casting the problem in a simple supply and demand framework, we characterize the level of applications and acceptance standard that result in equilibrium. The equilibrium success rate (grants over applications) decreases in the budget, consistent with some recent evidence, if and only if the distribution of types has decreasing hazard rate. In all stable equilibria resulting when funds are allocated across fields proportionally to applications--as well as under apportionment rules in a general class characterized in the paper--an increase in noise in the evaluation in a field perversely raises applications in that field and reduces applications in all the other fields. We characterize how the design of allocation rules can be modified to improve welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Ottaviani, Marco, 2020. "Grantmaking," CEPR Discussion Papers 15389, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15389
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    • Marco Ottaviani, 2020. "Grantmaking," Working Papers 672, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Grants; Applications; Grading on a curve; Evaluation across fields; Formula-based allocation; Proportional allocation; Payline; Unraveling; Signal noise;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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