IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/13871.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act

Author

Listed:
  • Oosterlinck, Kim
  • Lacroix, Jean
  • Méon, Pierre-Guillaume

Abstract

The literature on political dynasties in democracies usually considers them as a homogenous group and points out their negative effects. By contrast, we argue that they may differ according to their origin and that democratic dynasties –– those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals –– show stronger support for democracy. This claim is backed by an analysis of the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940, of an enabling act granting full power to Marshal Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third Republic. Using newly collected data from the biographies of the members of the then parliament, we observe that members of a democratic dynasty were more likely, by a margin of between 7.6 and 9.0 percentage points, to oppose the act than were members of other political dynasties or elected representatives belonging to no political dynasty. We report suggestive evidence showing that the effect of democratic dynasties was possibly driven by internalized democratic norms and beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13871
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP13871
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M., 2018. "Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 706-712, August.
    2. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    3. Querubin, Pablo, 2016. "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(2), pages 151-181, July.
    4. Thomas Piketty, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 551-584.
    5. Olle Folke & Torsten Persson & Johanna Rickne, 2017. "Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Benefits to Relatives of Top Politicians," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 495-517, October.
    6. Gelpi, Christopher & Feaver, Peter D., 2002. "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 779-793, December.
    7. Levitt, Steven D, 1996. "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 425-441, June.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    9. Horowitz, Michael C. & Stam, Allan C., 2014. "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 527-559, July.
    10. Bruno S. Frey & David A. Savage & Benno Torgler, 2011. "Behavior under Extreme Conditions: The Titanic Disaster," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 209-222, Winter.
    11. Cesi Cruz & Julien Labonne & Pablo Querubín, 2017. "Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 3006-3037, October.
    12. Benny Geys, 2017. "Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capital," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 474-494, October.
    13. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April.
    14. Timothy Besley & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2017. "The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 123-144, June.
    15. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    16. Lauren Cohen & Christopher J. Malloy, 2014. "Friends in High Places," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 63-91, August.
    17. Benny Geys & Daniel M. Smith, 2017. "Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining Puzzles," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 446-454, October.
    18. Myerson, Roger B., 2008. "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 125-139, February.
    19. Jennings, M. Kent & Niemi, Richard G., 1968. "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 169-184, March.
    20. Roger B. Myerson, 2015. "Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 2083-2126, November.
    21. Aidt, T. S. & Rauh, C., 2017. "The Big Five personality traits and partisanship in England," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1745, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    22. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    23. Marcel Fafchamps & Julien Labonne, 2017. "Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 268-300.
    24. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Matthew O. Jackson, 2009. "Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 124-150, February.
    25. Martín Rossi, 2016. "Self-Perpetuation of Political Power: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Argentina," Working Papers 127, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Aug 2016.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
    2. Silve, Arthur & Verdier, Thierry, 2023. "The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-seeking Elites," CEPR Discussion Papers 18165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Brassiolo, Pablo & Estrada, Ricardo & Fajardo, Gustavo, 2020. "My (running) mate, the mayor: Political ties and access to public sector jobs in Ecuador," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    4. Martinez-Bravo, Monica & Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico, 2020. "Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil," CEPR Discussion Papers 14912, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Labonne, Julien & Parsa, Sahar & Querubin, Pablo, 2021. "Political dynasties, term limits and female political representation: Evidence from the Philippines," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 212-228.
    6. Park, Hyungmin, 2023. "Developmental Dictatorship and Middle Class-driven Democratisation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1485, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    7. Hyungmin Park, 2024. "Theory of developmental dictatorship," Discussion Papers 2024-10, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    8. Arild Engelsen Ruud & Kenneth Bo Nielsen, 2018. "Political Dynasticism: Networks, Trust, Risk," Studies in Indian Politics, , vol. 6(2), pages 157-167, December.
    9. Sebastian Bervoets & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2012. "The Role of Social Networks and Peer Effects in Education Transmission," Working Papers halshs-00793169, HAL.
    10. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2015. "Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 142-156.
    11. Stéphane Benveniste, 2024. "Political and Business Dynasties: a Social Gradient in Returns to Elite Education," Working Papers hal-04511165, HAL.
    12. Paul Vertier, 2018. "The Democratic Challenges of Electoral Representation and Populism: an Empirical Approach," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/7omfps2eu39, Sciences Po.
    13. Gatua, Josephine G., 2024. "Decentralization, social connections and primary health care: Evidence from Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    14. Christophe Lévêque, 2020. "Political connections, political favoritism and political competition: evidence from the granting of building permits by French mayors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 135-155, July.
    15. Ma, Debin & Rubin, Jared, 2019. "The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 277-294.
    16. Gille, Véronique, 2018. "Applying for social programs in India: Roles of local politics and caste networks in affirmative action," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 436-456.
    17. Ting Chen & James Kai-sing Kung, 2019. "Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(1), pages 185-226.
    18. Andrea Asoni, 2008. "Protection Of Property Rights And Growth As Political Equilibria," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(5), pages 953-987, December.
    19. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty–Competence Trade‐Off," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(5), pages 903-930, October.
    20. Etienne Farvaque & Alexander Mihailov & Alireza Naghavi, 2018. "The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-Off between Equality and Efficiency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(4), pages 707-742, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Autocratic reversals; Democratic dynasties; Voting behavior; World war ii;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13871. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.