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Political Dynasties in Defense of Democracy: The Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Lacroix

    (RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation - Université Paris-Saclay)

  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

    (Centre d'Etudes Economiques et Sociales de l'Environnement-Centre Emile Bernheim - ULB - Université libre de Bruxelles)

  • Kim Oosterlinck

    (ULB - Université libre de Bruxelles)

Abstract

The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled "pro-democratic dynasties," show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Lacroix & Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Kim Oosterlinck, 2023. "Political Dynasties in Defense of Democracy: The Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," Post-Print hal-04210349, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04210349
    DOI: 10.1017/S0022050723000104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stéphane Benveniste, 2024. "Political and Business Dynasties: a Social Gradient in Returns to Elite Education," AMSE Working Papers 2410, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

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