IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v178y2024ics0305750x24000329.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Decentralization, social connections and primary health care: Evidence from Kenya

Author

Listed:
  • Gatua, Josephine G.

Abstract

This research estimates the role of social connections in primary health care provision and their impact on health-related behavior. The study employs novel survey data from Kenya, combining information on households and community health workers (CHWs). The results show that social connections strongly influence the provision of health care: Being a relative or close friend to a CHW increases the probability that a household will receive a health-related visit by about 100 percent (compared to the sample mean). Furthermore, socially connected households exhibit improved health-related behavior, largely attributable to the information they acquire during visits from CHWs. This evidence suggests the existence of nepotism in primary healthcare provision, and further demonstrates how beneficiaries of nepotism may experience improved health outcomes. At the same time, the study underscores that CHWs can deliver essential healthcare services, with the potential to enhance overall community health. In resource-constrained settings like Kenya, and many African countries, targeting CHWs to those most in need may offer a promising avenue for achieving better health outcomes at a lower cost. However, such targeting will need to account for social connections.

Suggested Citation

  • Gatua, Josephine G., 2024. "Decentralization, social connections and primary health care: Evidence from Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:178:y:2024:i:c:s0305750x24000329
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106562
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X24000329
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2024.106562?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Aldrich, 2011. "The power of people: social capital’s role in recovery from the 1995 Kobe earthquake," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 56(3), pages 595-611, March.
    2. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Joseph G. Altonji & Todd E. Elder & Christopher R. Taber, 2005. "Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 151-184, February.
    5. Kjellsson, Gustav & Clarke, Philip & Gerdtham, Ulf-G., 2014. "Forgetting to remember or remembering to forget: A study of the recall period length in health care survey questions," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 34-46.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2000. "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(3), pages 847-904.
    7. Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, April.
    8. A Stefano Caria & Marcel Fafchamps, 2014. "Cooperation and Expectations in Networks: Evidence from a Network Public Good Experiment in Rural India," CSAE Working Paper Series 2014-33, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    9. Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 2, number 9780226041162, October.
    10. Jessica Cohen & Pascaline Dupas & Simone Schaner, 2015. "Price Subsidies, Diagnostic Tests, and Targeting of Malaria Treatment: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 609-645, February.
    11. Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy & Frank Verboven, 2005. "Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 371-396, June.
    12. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
    13. Emily Oster, 2019. "Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(2), pages 187-204, April.
    14. Hodor, Michal, 2021. "Family health spillovers: evidence from the RAND health insurance experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    15. Margherita Comola & Marcel Fafchamps, 2014. "Testing Unilateral and Bilateral Link Formation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(579), pages 954-976, September.
    16. Sisir Debnath & Tarun Jain, 2020. "Social connections and tertiary health‐care utilization," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 464-474, April.
    17. Catharina Hjortsberg, 2003. "Why do the sick not utilise health care? The case of Zambia," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(9), pages 755-770, September.
    18. Markussen, Thomas & Tarp, Finn, 2014. "Political connections and land-related investment in rural Vietnam," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 291-302.
    19. Stefano Gagliarducci & Marco Manacorda, 2020. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 67-95, April.
    20. Jessica Cohen & Pascaline Dupas, 2010. "Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a Randomized Malaria Prevention Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 1-45.
    21. Jishnu Das & Jeffrey Hammer & Kenneth Leonard, 2008. "The Quality of Medical Advice in Low-Income Countries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 93-114, Spring.
    22. Devillanova, Carlo, 2008. "Social networks, information and health care utilization: Evidence from undocumented immigrants in Milan," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 265-286, March.
    23. Johnson, Simon & Mitton, Todd, 2003. "Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-382, February.
    24. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
    25. Madajewicz, Malgosia & Tompsett, Anna & Habib, Md. Ahasan, 2021. "How does delegating decisions to communities affect the provision and use of a public service? Evidence from a field experiment in Bangladesh," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    26. Marcel Fafchamps & Julien Labonne, 2017. "Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 268-300.
    27. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411.
    28. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    29. Cruz, Cesi & Labonne, Julien & Querubín, Pablo, 2020. "Social Network Structures and the Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the Philippines," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(2), pages 486-501, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maurer, Stephan E., 2018. "Voting Behavior and Public Employment in Nazi Germany," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 1-39, March.
    2. Christophe Lévêque, 2020. "Political connections, political favoritism and political competition: evidence from the granting of building permits by French mayors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 135-155, July.
    3. Marcel Fafchamps & Julien Labonne, 2017. "Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 268-300.
    4. Cheng, Hui-Pei & Swee, Eik Leong, 2024. "Farewell President! Political favoritism, economic inequality, and political polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    5. Hung, Chi-Hsiou D. & Jiang, Yuxiang & Liu, Frank Hong & Tu, Hong & Wang, Senyu, 2017. "Bank political connections and performance in China," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 57-69.
    6. Finn Tarp & Sam Jones & Felix Schilling, 2021. "Doing business while holding public office: Evidence from Mozambique’s firm registry," DERG working paper series 21-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Development Economics Research Group (DERG).
    7. Ahmed Tahoun & Laurence van Lent, 2016. "The Personal Wealth Interests of Politicians and the Stabilization of Financial Markets," Working Papers Series 52, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    8. Deng, Weiguang & Li, Xue & Zhang, Junsen, 2023. "Marriage, gender, and premiums from cadre parents," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    9. Salome Baslandze, 2018. "Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics," 2018 Meeting Papers 1036, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Benjamin M. Blau, 2017. "Lobbying, political connections and emergency lending by the Federal Reserve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 333-358, September.
    11. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    12. Francis,David C. & Kubinec ,Robert, 2022. "Beyond Political Connections : A Measurement Model Approach to Estimating Firm-levelPolitical Influence in 41 Economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 10119, The World Bank.
    13. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    14. Hallward-Driemeier,Mary C. & Kochanova,Anna & Rijkers,Bob, 2020. "Does Democratization Promote Competition? : Indonesian Manufacturing Pre and Post Suharto," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9112, The World Bank.
    15. Zengji Song & Abraham Nahm & Zongyi Zhang, 2015. "The value of partial state ownership in publicly listed private sector enterprises: evidence from China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 336-353, September.
    16. Yan Leung Cheung & P. Raghavendra Rau & Aris Stouraitis, 2012. "How much do firms pay as bribes and what benefits do they get? Evidence from corruption cases worldwide," NBER Working Papers 17981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Chune Young Chung & Jung Hoon Byun & Jason Young, 2019. "Corporate Political Ties and Firm Value: Comparative Analysis in the Korean Market," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-25, January.
    18. Nan Zhang & Qiaozhuan Liang & Huiying Li & Xiao Wang, 2022. "The organizational relationship–based political connection and debt financing: Evidence from Chinese private firms," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 69-105, January.
    19. Leonidas Koutsougeras & Manuel Santos & Fei Xu, 2019. "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-03393076, HAL.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:178:y:2024:i:c:s0305750x24000329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.