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The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence

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  • Besley, Timothy
  • Reynal-Querol, Marta

Abstract

Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Timothy & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2017. "The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69615, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:69615
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69615/
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    Cited by:

    1. Miltos Makris & Theodore Palivos & Marios Zachariadis, 2020. "Representative Democracy with or without Elections: An Economic Analysis," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 06-2020, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    2. Claudio Ferraz & Federico Finan & Monica Maretinez-Bravo, 2020. "Political Power, Elite Control, and Long-Run Development: Evidence from Brazil," Working Papers wp2020_2008, CEMFI.
    3. Daniele, Gianmarco & Romarri, Alessio & Vertier, Paul, 2021. "Dynasties and policymaking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 89-110.
    4. Joshy Z. Easaw & Samuli Leppälä, 2023. "Democracy, state capacity and public finance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 301-321, April.
    5. Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "Governance and the dimensions of autocracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 131-148, June.
    7. Yamasaki, Junichi, 2020. "Time horizon of government and public goods investment: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    8. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Khalifa, Sherif & Konso Mulali, Ben, 2020. "Who Becomes Minister in an Autocratic Regime? Evidence From DRC," MPRA Paper 103022, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    growth; hereditary institutions; political agency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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