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Friends in High Places

Author

Listed:
  • Lauren Cohen
  • Christopher J. Malloy

Abstract

We demonstrate that personal connections amongst US politicians have a significant impact on Senate voting behavior. Networks based on alumni connections between politicians are consistent predictors of voting behavior. We estimate sharp measures that control for common characteristics of the network, as well as heterogeneous impacts of a common network characteristic across votes. We find that the effect of alumni networks is close to 60 percent as large as the effect of state-level considerations. We show that politicians use school ties as a mechanism to engage in vote trading ("logrolling"), and that alumni networks help facilitate the procurement of discretionary earmarks.

Suggested Citation

  • Lauren Cohen & Christopher J. Malloy, 2014. "Friends in High Places," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 63-91, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:6:y:2014:i:3:p:63-91
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.6.3.63
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Fremeth & Brian Kelleher Richter & Brandon Schaufele, 2018. "Spillovers from regulating corporate campaign contributions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 244-265, December.
    2. Marco Battaglini & Eleonora Patacchini & Edoardo Rainone, 2019. "Endogenous Social Connections in Legislatures," NBER Working Papers 25988, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Matthew I. Jones, 2024. "Equilibria and Group Welfare in Vote Trading Systems," Papers 2406.09536, arXiv.org.
    4. Shantanu Gupta & Zachary C. Lipton & David Childers, 2020. "Estimating Treatment Effects with Observed Confounders and Mediators," Papers 2003.11991, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
    5. Delaney, Jason & Jacobson, Sarah, 2015. "The good of the few: Reciprocal acts and the provision of a public bad," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 46-55.
    6. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2018. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series dp-304, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    7. Akey, Pat & Heimer, Rawley Z. & Lewellen, Stefan, 2021. "Politicizing consumer credit," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 627-655.
    8. Su, Zhong-qin & Xiao, Zuoping & Yu, Lin, 2019. "Do political connections enhance or impede corporate innovation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 94-110.
    9. Nikolaj Harmon & Raymond Fisman & Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Peer Effects in Legislative Voting," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 156-180, October.
    10. Marco Battaglini & Forrest W. Crawford & Eleonora Patacchini & Sida Peng, 2020. "A Graphical Lasso Approach to Estimating Network Connections: The Case of U.S. Lawmakers," NBER Working Papers 27557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Oosterlinck, Kim & Lacroix, Jean & Méon, Pierre-Guillaume, 2019. "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the Case of France’s 1940 Enabling Act," CEPR Discussion Papers 13871, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Stephan, Andrew P. & Walther, Beverly R. & Wellman, Laura A., 2021. "Profiting from connections: Do politicians receive stock tips from brokerage houses?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
    13. Das Chaudhury, Ratul & Leister, C. Matthew & Rai, Birendra, 2023. "Influencing a polarized and connected legislature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 833-850.
    14. Guerrero, Omar & Matter, Ulrich, 2021. "Quantifying Vote Trading Through Network Reciprocity," Economics Working Paper Series 2106, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    15. Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers & Yves Zenou, 2016. "Networks: An Economic Perspective," Papers 1608.07901, arXiv.org.
    16. Afzali, Mansoor & Ҫolak, Gönül & Fu, Mengchuan, 2021. "Economic uncertainty and corruption: Evidence from public and private firms," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    17. Raymond Fisman & Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang & Rong Xu, 2018. "Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1134-1171.
    18. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    19. Charroin, Lisa & Vanberg, Christoph, 2025. "Logrolling affects the relative performance of alternative q-majority rules," Working Papers 0758, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    20. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    21. Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov & Philip Valta, 2023. "Self-Funding of Political Campaigns," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(4), pages 2425-2448, April.
    22. Dayanandan, Ajit & Donker, Han & Nofsinger, John, 2019. "The role of caste for board membership, CEO, and interlocking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 29-41.
    23. Omar A. Guerrero & Ulrich Matter, 2016. "Revealing the Anatomy of Vote Trading," Papers 1611.01381, arXiv.org.
    24. Ilona Babenko & Viktar Fedaseyeu & Song Zhang, 2017. "Executives In Politics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1762, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    25. John M. Griffin & Clark Liu & Tao Shu, 2022. "Is the Chinese Anticorruption Campaign Authentic? Evidence from Corporate Investigations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(10), pages 7248-7273, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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