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Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets

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  • Alexey I. Kushnir

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  • Alexey I. Kushnir, 2010. "Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000351, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000351
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    1. d’ASPREMONT, C. & PELEG, B., 1986. "Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1986042, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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