Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice
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- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
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- Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Communication and Bargaining in the Spatial Model," Papers 09-20-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Deliberative Democracy or Market Democracy: Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information," Papers 03-28-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003.
"Committee Design in the Presence of Communication,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1411, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm351, Yale School of Management.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2007.
"Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 236-273, January.
- Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny & Eliaz, Kfir, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," CEPR Discussion Papers 4480, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Debraj Ray & Kfir Eliaz & Ronny Razin, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement," Working Papers 2004.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Henry, Emeric, 2008.
"The informational role of supermajorities,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
- Emeric Henry, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Post-Print hal-03607658, HAL.
- Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Elisabeth Schulte, 2010.
"Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 97-118, July.
- Elisabeth Schulte, 2006. "Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity in Committees," JEPS Working Papers 06-003, JEPS.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
- Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Papers 04-06-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 301-327, July.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2006.
"Would rational voters acquire costly information?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
- Cesar Martinelli, 2002. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Working Papers 0210, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- César Martinelli, 2004. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000593, UCLA Department of Economics.
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