Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice
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- Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
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- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
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"The informational role of supermajorities,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2225-2239, October.
- Emeric Henry, 2008. "The informational role of supermajorities," Post-Print hal-03607658, HAL.
- Meirowitz, Adam, 2004. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Papers 04-06-2004, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ray, Debraj & Razin, Ronny, 2007.
"Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement,"
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- Elisabeth Schulte, 2010.
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- Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 301-327, July.
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- César Martinelli, 2004. "Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000593, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ian Ayres & Colin Rowat & Nasser Zakariya, 2004. "Optimal two stage committee voting rules," Game Theory and Information 0412006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
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