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Dealing with Major Technological Risks

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  • Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
  • Carel Vachon

Abstract

This article is concerned with the management of major hazards stemming from technology and entailing potentially dreadful consequences. It proposes a brief survey of the0501n difficulties and policy issues arising both in public and private decision making when dealing with major technological risks. Three themes are considered: risk assessment, risk sharing and risk control. Issues related to evaluation methods, to risk perception and to the acceptable level of risk are first examined. The article then goes on to explore the problem of optimal risk sharing between the different stakeholders. The firm's liability and extended liability to the firm's partners are considered. Insurance issues are also discussed. Lastly, the survey addresses the control of risks both from a prevention and from a damage mitigation point of view. The various instruments available to the State to reduce risks are reviewed and several issues are also raised with respect to the measures firms can take to reduce risks. Investment in safety, human error, organisational design and information disclosure are addressed in this section. The topics of siting and urban planning are analysed as mitigation strategies, and the important aspect of emergency planning ends the survey. Cet article d'intérêt général porte sur la gestion des risques d'origine technologique aux conséquences potentiellement catastrophiques. Il s'agit d'un document de synthèse destiné à cerner les problèmes fondamentaux en matière de gestion publique et privée des risques technologiques majeurs. Trois thèmes y sont traités: l'évaluation, la distribution et le contrôle des risques. Les questions se rapportant aux méthodes d'évaluation, à la perception des risques et aux difficultés liées à l'établissement d'un seuil de tolérance sont d'abord passées en revue. La seconde partie du document met en lumière les difficultés que présente le partage optimal du risque entre les différents agents. La responsabilité civile de la firme et de ses partenaires est alors examinée. Les problèmes liés à l'assurance contre ce type de risque sont aussi brièvement décrits. Cet article traite enfin du contrôle des risques en couvrant à la fois les approches préventives et les stratégies d'atténuation des dommages. On y aborde premièrement les instruments de contrôle dont dispose l'État pour réduire les risques. Du côté des firmes, les sujets tels que l'investissement en sécurité, l'erreur humaine, le design organisationnel et la divulgation de l'information sont passés en revue. L'aménagement du territoire et la gestion des urgences sont ensuite abordés de façon succincte dans la dernière partie de l'article.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Carel Vachon, 1999. "Dealing with Major Technological Risks," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-29, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:99s-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. António Brandão Moniz, 2012. "Avaliação participativa de tecnologia e sustentabilidade organizacional [Participative technology assessment and organisational sustainability]," IET Working Papers Series 06/2012, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, IET/CICS.NOVA-Interdisciplinary Centre on Social Sciences, Faculty of Science and Technology.
    2. Jean-Grégoire Bernard & Benoit Aubert & Simon Bourdeau & Éric Clément & Caroline Debuissy & Marie-Josée Dumoulin & Marc Laberge & Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Ingrid Peignier, 2002. "Le risque : un modèle conceptuel d'intégration," CIRANO Project Reports 2002rp-16, CIRANO.
    3. Picard, Pierre & Chemarin, Sophie, 2004. "Appréhension et prévention des risques industriels," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0502, CEPREMAP.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Safety; major risks; risk assessment; risk sharing; risk control; prevention; mitigation; Sécurité; risques majeurs; évaluation des risques; distribution des risques; contrôle des risques; prévention; atténuation;
    All these keywords.

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