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Towards an Agent-Based Approach for Multimarket Package e-Procurement

Author

Listed:
  • Houssein Ben-Ameur
  • Brahim Chaib-draa
  • Robert Gérin-Lajoie
  • Peter Kropf
  • Stéphane Vaucher

Abstract

While most e-commerce research focuses on one market based problems, less work has been done on multimarket aggregation. Nowadays it is important to address the multimarket package e-procurement problem if we want to acquire a combination of goods and services from different suppliers and service providers. To achieve this, one should address the issues pertaining to identifying of a company's needs, discovering potential partners and suppliers, gathering distributed information and conducting combined negotiations, creating a seamless of information flow with different heterogeneous markets, suppliers, and partners, and finally concluding transactions. Several commercial e-procurement applications already automate some aspects of the procurement processes, helping decision makers and employees complete their purchasing activity. But none take into account the key aspects of combining goods and services into one aggregated package. Agent-based systems are well equipped to address the challenges of multimarket package e-procurement. Indeed, goal driven autonomous agents aim to satisfy user requirements and preferences while being flexible enough to deal with the diversity of semantics amongst markets, suppliers, service providers, partners and individual sellers. A distributed common shared space, called infospace, comprised of the negotiation exchanges and states, allows for agent coordination, market aggregation, and packages construction. This paper presents some issues and challenges faced in multimarket package e-procurement, and puts forward an agent-based approach to deal with them. La plupart des recherches sur le commerce électronique s'intéressent aux problèmes reliés à des marchés uniques. Moins de travaux ont été réalisés autour de l'approvisionnement multimarché. Le problème d'approvisionnement électronique (e-procurement) multimarché d'un paquet consiste en l'acquisition d'une combinaison d'objets à partir de différents fournisseurs de biens et services. Afin d'y parvenir, nous devons identifier les besoins de l'entreprise, découvrir les fournisseurs et partenaires potentiels, extraire de l'information distribuée et eventuellement gérer des négociations combinées, gérer le flux d'information circulant entre des marchés hétérogènes, vendeurs et partenaires, et finalement conclure des transactions. Il existe un certain nombre d'applications commerciales d'approvisionnement électronique qui automatisent quelques aspects du processus d'approvisionnement pour les entreprises, en aidant les preneurs de décisions et les employés dans leurs activités d'achats et d'approvisionnement. Mais aucune de ces applications ne tient en compte l'aspect de combinaison d'objets en un paquet agrégé. Les systèmes à base d'agents représentent une approche adéquate pour faire face aux problématiques posées de l'approvisionnement électronique multimarché d'un paquet. En effet, les agents autonomes essayent de satisfaire les besoins et préférences de l'utilisateur en étant assez flexibles pour gérer la diversité sémantique entre marchés, vendeurs, et fournisseurs de services. Un espace commun et partagé, appelé InfoSpace, contenant les échanges de données et les états des négociations, assure la coordination des agents, l'agrégation des marchés et la construction des paquets. Ce papier présente quelques problématiques et défis reliés à l'approvisionnement électronique multimarché de paquets, et expose une approche basée sur les agents pour y faire face.

Suggested Citation

  • Houssein Ben-Ameur & Brahim Chaib-draa & Robert Gérin-Lajoie & Peter Kropf & Stéphane Vaucher, 2002. "Towards an Agent-Based Approach for Multimarket Package e-Procurement," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-73, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-73
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2002s-73.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hakim Alj & Morad Benyoucef & Rudolf K Keller & Kim Levy, 2002. "A Rule-driven Approach for Defining the Behavior of Negotiating Software Agents," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-23, CIRANO.
    2. Paul Klemperer (ed.), 2000. "The Economic Theory of Auctions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1669.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    4. Sarita Bassil & Morad Benyoucef & Rudolf K Keller & Peter Kropf, 2002. "Addressing Dynamism in E-negotiations by Workflow Management Systems," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-56, CIRANO.
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