IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/oropre/v52y2004i3p346-367.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System

Author

Listed:
  • Garrett van Ryzin

    (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 412 Uris Hall, New York, New York 10027)

  • Gustavo Vulcano

    (Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10012)

Abstract

We consider a joint inventory-pricing problem in which buyers act strategically and bid for units of a firm's product over an infinite horizon. The number of bidders in each period as well as the individual bidders' valuations are random but stationary over time. There is a holding cost for inventory and a unit cost for ordering more stock from an outside supplier. Backordering is not allowed. The firm must decide how to conduct its auctions and how to replenish its stock over time to maximize its profits. We show that the optimal auction and replenishment policy for this problem is quite simple, consisting of running a standard first-price or second-price auction with a fixed reserve price in each period and following an order-up-to (basestock) policy for replenishing inventory at the end of each period. Moreover, the optimal basestock level can be easily computed. We then compare this optimal basestock, reserve-price-auction policy to a traditional basestock, list-price policy. We prove that in the limiting case of one buyer per period and in the limiting case of a large number of buyers per period and linear holding cost, list pricing is optimal. List pricing also becomes optimal as the holding cost tends to zero. Numerical comparisons confirm these theoretical results and show that auctions provide significant benefits when: (1) the number of buyers is moderate, (2) holding costs are high, or (3) there is high variability in the number of buyers per period.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrett van Ryzin & Gustavo Vulcano, 2004. "Optimal Auctioning and Ordering in an Infinite Horizon Inventory-Pricing System," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 52(3), pages 346-367, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:52:y:2004:i:3:p:346-367
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.1040.0105
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1040.0105
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/opre.1040.0105?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Awi Federgruen & Aliza Heching, 1999. "Combined Pricing and Inventory Control Under Uncertainty," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(3), pages 454-475, June.
    3. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2006. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 217-241, Springer.
    4. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    5. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    6. Michael H. Rothkopf & Ronald M. Harstad, 1994. "Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(3), pages 364-384, March.
    7. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    8. John C. Harsanyi, 1968. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(5), pages 320-334, January.
    9. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    10. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    11. David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 183-192, Summer.
    12. Yvan Lengwiler, 1999. "The multiple unit auction with variable supply," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 373-392.
    13. Zabel, Edward, 1972. "Multiperiod monopoly under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 524-536, December.
    14. Milgrom, Paul, 1989. "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 3-22, Summer.
    15. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    16. L. Joseph Thomas, 1974. "Technical Note—Price and Production Decisions with Random Demand," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(3), pages 513-518, June.
    17. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, 1983. "Price Smoothing and Inventory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 87-98.
    18. Gustavo Vulcano & Garrett van Ryzin & Costis Maglaras, 2002. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(11), pages 1388-1407, November.
    19. Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1996. "Auctions: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 367-420, December.
    20. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Anderson, Chris K. & Xie, Xiaoqing, 2014. "Pricing and market segmentation using opaque selling mechanisms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 233(1), pages 263-272.
    2. Ghate, Archis, 2015. "Optimal minimum bids and inventory scrapping in sequential, single-unit, Vickrey auctions with demand learning," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 245(2), pages 555-570.
    3. Liu, Shuren & Liu, Changgeng & Hu, Qiying, 2013. "Optimal procurement strategies by reverse auctions with stochastic demand," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 430-435.
    4. Sun, Daewon & Li, Erick & Hayya, Jack C., 2010. "The optimal format to sell a product through the internet: Posted price, auction, and buy-price auction," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 147-157, September.
    5. Chen, Xi & Ghate, Archis & Tripathi, Arvind, 2011. "Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(1), pages 257-267, November.
    6. Hummel, Patrick, 2015. "Simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 269-284.
    7. Ying-Ju Chen & Gustavo Vulcano, 2009. "Effects of Information Disclosure Under First- and Second-Price Auctions in a Supply Chain Setting," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 11(2), pages 299-316, September.
    8. Pooya Farahvash & Tayfur Altiok, 2011. "A multi-period inventory model with multi-dimensional procurement bidding," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 186(1), pages 101-118, June.
    9. Woonghee Tim Huh & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2008. "Inventory Management with Auctions and Other Sales Channels: Optimality of (s, S) Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(1), pages 139-150, January.
    10. Ying-Ju Chen, 2017. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Display Advertising," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 897-913, August.
    11. Hila Etzion & Edieal Pinker & Abraham Seidmann, 2006. "Analyzing the Simultaneous Use of Auctions and Posted Prices for Online Selling," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 8(1), pages 68-91, March.
    12. Yiting Xing & Ling Li & Zhuming Bi & Marzena Wilamowska‐Korsak & Li Zhang, 2013. "Operations Research (OR) in Service Industries: A Comprehensive Review," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 300-353, May.
    13. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    14. René Caldentey & Gustavo Vulcano, 2007. "Online Auction and List Price Revenue Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(5), pages 795-813, May.
    15. Cem Ozturk, O. & Karabatı, Selçuk, 2017. "A decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 263(3), pages 922-934.
    16. Pooya Farahvash & Tayfur Altiok, 2008. "Application of multi-dimensional procurement auction in single-period inventory models," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 229-251, November.
    17. Jiang, Zhong-Zhong & Fang, Shu-Cherng & Fan, Zhi-Ping & Wang, Dingwei, 2013. "Selecting optimal selling format of a product in B2C online auctions with boundedly rational customers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(1), pages 139-153.
    18. Jifeng Cao & Cheng Ma, 2022. "Procurement Strategies and Auction Mechanism for Heterogeneous Service Providers in a Service Supply Chain," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(15), pages 1-36, July.
    19. Yu Ning & Su Xiu Xu & George Q. Huang & Xudong Lin, 2021. "Optimal digital product auctions with unlimited supply and rebidding behavior," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 307(1), pages 399-416, December.
    20. Sun, Daewon, 2008. "Dual mechanism for an online retailer," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 903-921, June.
    21. Patrick Hummel, 2018. "How do selling mechanisms affect profits, surplus, capacity and prices with unknown demand?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 51(1), pages 94-126, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gustavo Vulcano & Garrett van Ryzin & Costis Maglaras, 2002. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Revenue Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(11), pages 1388-1407, November.
    2. Sun, Daewon, 2008. "Dual mechanism for an online retailer," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 187(3), pages 903-921, June.
    3. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    5. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    6. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    7. Edieal J. Pinker & Abraham Seidmann & Yaniv Vakrat, 2003. "Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages 1457-1484, November.
    8. Rachel R. Chen & Robin O. Roundy & Rachel Q. Zhang & Ganesh Janakiraman, 2005. "Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 467-482, March.
    9. Çağıl Koçyiğit & Garud Iyengar & Daniel Kuhn & Wolfram Wiesemann, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 159-189, January.
    10. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0504, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    11. Kashyap, Ravi, 2018. "Auction theory adaptations for real life applications," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 452-481.
    12. Michael H. Rothkopf & Sunju Park, 2001. "An Elementary Introduction to Auctions," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 83-97, December.
    13. Ravi Kashyap, 2018. "Auction Theory Adaptations for Real Life Applications," Papers 1810.01736, arXiv.org, revised May 2019.
    14. Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, May.
    15. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    16. Ramanathan Subramaniam & R. Venkatesh, 2009. "Optimal Bundling Strategies in Multiobject Auctions of Complements or Substitutes," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(2), pages 264-273, 03-04.
    17. Chu, Singfat, 2012. "Allocation flexibility and price efficiency within Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1541-1550.
    18. Jarl G. Kallberg & Crocker H. Liu & Adam Nowak, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Double Round Auctions," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(2), pages 531-555, June.
    19. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2020. "Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    20. Xu, Xiaoshu & Levin, Dan & Ye, Lixin, 2013. "Auctions with entry and resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 92-105.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:52:y:2004:i:3:p:346-367. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.