IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ceasxx/v62y2010i2p293-327.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors

Author

Listed:
  • Ora Reuter

Abstract

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.

Suggested Citation

  • Ora Reuter, 2010. "The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors," Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 62(2), pages 293-327.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:62:y:2010:i:2:p:293-327
    DOI: 10.1080/09668130903506847
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09668130903506847
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09668130903506847?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Israel Marques II & Eugenia Nazrullaeva & Andrei Yakovlev, 2016. "Substituting Distribution for Growth: The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 23-54, March.
    2. Kvartiuk, Vasyl & Herzfeld, Thomas, 2021. "Redistributive politics in Russia: The political economy of agricultural subsidies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 63(1), pages 1-30.
    3. Koenig, Christoph, 2019. "Patronage and Election Fraud: Insights from Russia’s Governors 2000–2012," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 433, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Elena V. Sirotkina, 2014. "Managed Competition And Voting Stability: Evidence From Russian Legislative Elections (2003-2011)," HSE Working papers WP BRP 15/PS/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Belmonte, Alessandro & Rochlitz, Michael, 2019. "The political economy of collective memories: Evidence from Russian politics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 229-250.
    6. Vasilyeva, Olga & Libman, Alexander, 2020. "Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation, natural resources and economic growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. P. Panov & C. Ross, 2024. "Geographic Factors of Voting in Russian Regions: Direct and Contextual Effects," Regional Research of Russia, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 468-477, September.
    8. Coleman, Stephen, 2014. "Evolution of the Russian Political Party System under the Influence of Social Conformity: 1993-2011," MPRA Paper 59038, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Coleman, Stephen, 2018. "Voting and conformity: Russia, 1993–2016," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 87-95.
    10. Elena Sirotkina & Svetlana Karandashova, 2016. "How Multilevel Elite Loyalty Strengthens Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 36/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:62:y:2010:i:2:p:293-327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/ceas .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.