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Rational Drivers and the Choice Between Congestion Tolls and Tradeable Permits: A Political Economy Model

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno De Borger
  • Amihai Glazer
  • Stef Proost

Abstract

People who anticipate the introduction of a policy can adapt their behavior, perhaps in ways that make the policy ineffective and exacerbate the problem to be addressed. This paper develops a political economy model to study strategic behavior related to the introduction of congestion policies, focusing on tradeable driving permits and congestion tolls. We have the following results. First, anticipatory behavior after the policies are announced but prior to their introduction may make both congestion policies welfare-reducing. Second, drivers will oppose the policies even when they receive all permits for free, or toll revenues are distributed to drivers only. As a consequence, strategic behavior makes it more difficult to get a political majority to support both congestion policies. Third, in an infinite horizon setting, tradable permits are superior to congestion tolls in that they avoid strategic behavior once the system is implemented. In contrast, with congestion tolls the steady-state equilibrium implies continuing strategic behavior. Drivers will always strictly prefer a permit system over congestion tolls as long as they receive a sufficient share of the permits for free.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno De Borger & Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2021. "Rational Drivers and the Choice Between Congestion Tolls and Tradeable Permits: A Political Economy Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 8821, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anticipatory behaviour; political economy; congestion tolls; tradeable driving permits; strategic behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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