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Motivation and incentives in an online labor market

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian Fest
  • Ola Kvaløy
  • Petra Nieken
  • Anja Schöttner

Abstract

In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the effect of performance pay and two common leadership techniques: Positive expectations and specific goals. We find that positive expectations have a significant negative effect on quantity - and no effect on quality - irrespective of how the workers are paid. On average, workers who receive positive expectations before they start to work, have a five percent lower output than those who do not. Goal-setting has no significant effect, neither on quantity nor quality. Performance pay, in contrast, has a strong positive effect on quantity, although we find no difference between high and low piece rates. Finally, we find no evidence of a multitask problem. Piece rates have no negative effects on the quality of work, even if it is fully possible for the workers to be less accurate and thereby substituting quality for higher quantity.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Fest & Ola Kvaløy & Petra Nieken & Anja Schöttner, 2019. "Motivation and incentives in an online labor market," CESifo Working Paper Series 7526, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7526
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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Englmaier & Stefan Grimm & Dominik Grothe & David Schindler & Simeon Schudy, 2021. "The Value of Leadership: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9273, CESifo.
    2. Mylène Lagarde & Duane Blaauw, 2021. "Effects of incentive framing on performance and effort: evidence from a medically framed experiment," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(1), pages 33-48, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    non-monetary motivation; performance pay; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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