Counseling and Monitoring of Unemployed Workers: Theory and Evidence from a Social Experiment
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- Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006.
"Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(5), pages 565-585, September.
- Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?," Working Paper Series 2003:17, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2003. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1019, CESifo.
- Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2005. "Optimal unemployment insurance design: time limits, monitoring, or workfare?," Working Paper Series 2005:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Gerard J. van den Berg & Annette H. Bergemann & Marco Caliendo, 2009.
"The Effect of Active Labor Market Programs on Not-Yet Treated Unemployed Individuals,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 606-616, 04-05.
- van den Berg, Gerard J. & Bergemann, Annette & Caliendo, Marco, 2008. "The Effect of Active Labor Market Programs on Not-Yet Treated Unemployed Individuals," IZA Discussion Papers 3825, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- van den Berg, Gerard J. & Bergemann, Annette & Caliendo, Marco, 2008. "The effect of active labor market programs on not-yet treated unemployed individuals," Working Paper Series 2008:26, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Robert Breunig & Deborah A. Cobb‐Clark & Yvonne Dunlop & Marion Terrill, 2003.
"Assisting the Long‐Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomised Trial,"
The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 79(244), pages 84-102, March.
- Breunig, Robert & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. & Dunlop, Yvonne & Terrill, Marion, 2002. "Assisting the Long-Term Unemployed: Results from a Randomized Trial," IZA Discussion Papers 628, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Nicola Pavoni & G. L. Violante, 2007.
"Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(1), pages 283-318.
- Nicola Pavoni & Giovanni L. Violante, 2005. "Optimal welfare-to-work programs," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 143, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Violante, Giovanni & Pavoni, Nicola, 2006. "Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs," CEPR Discussion Papers 5937, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007.
"Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Other publications TiSEM 19920bcf-0688-4222-9ae8-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2002. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Working Paper Series 2002:21, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2007. "Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions," Other publications TiSEM f2b1b916-41f5-4964-bad8-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan C. & Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3082, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Working Paper Series 2001:20, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours & Jan C. van Ours, 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 616, CESifo.
- Boone, Jan & Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil & van Ours, Jan C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," IZA Discussion Papers 401, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Boone, J. & Fredriksson, P. & Holmlund, B. & van Ours, J.C., 2001. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Discussion Paper 2001-85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Michael White and Genevieve Knight, 2003. "Benchmarking the effectiveness of NDYP: A review of European and US literature on the microeconomic effects of labour market programmes for young people," PSI Research Discussion Series 10, Policy Studies Institute, UK.
- Aysit Tansel & H. Mehmet Taşçı, 2010.
"Hazard Analysis of Unemployment Duration by Gender in a Developing Country: The Case of Turkey,"
LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 24(4), pages 501-530, December.
- Aysit Tansel & H. Mehmet Tasci, 2009. "Hazard Analysis of Unemployment Duration by Gender in a Developing Country: The Case of Turkey," ERC Working Papers 0903, ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, revised Oct 2009.
- Tansel, Aysit & Tasci, H. Mehmet, 2010. "Hazard Analysis of Unemployment Duration by Gender in a Developing Country: The Case of Turkey," IZA Discussion Papers 4844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Aysit Tansel & H.Mehmet Tasçi, 2010. "Hazard Analysis of Unemployment Duration by Gender in A Developing Country: The Case of Turkey," Working Papers 521, Economic Research Forum, revised 05 Jan 2010.
- Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006.
"Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research,"
Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
- Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Working Paper Series 2003:10, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research," Working Paper Series 2003:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2003. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," CESifo Working Paper Series 922, CESifo.
- Solenne Tanguy, 2006.
"Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation,"
Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(1), pages 43-64.
- Solenne Tanguy, 2004. "Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04034, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Hämäläinen, Kari & Uusitalo, Roope & Vuori, Jukka, 2008.
"Varying biases in matching estimates: Evidence from two randomised job search training experiments,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 604-618, August.
- Hämäläinen, Kari & Uusitalo, Roope & Vuori, Jukka, 2008. "Varying Biases in the Matching Estimates: Evidence from Two Randomized Job Search Training Experiments," Discussion Papers 438, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
- Hesselius, Patrik & Johansson, Per & Larsson, Laura, 2005. "Monitoring sickness insurance claimants: evidence from a social experiment," Working Paper Series 2005:15, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Trine Filges & Geir Smedslund & Anne‐Sofie Due Knudsen & Anne‐Marie Klint Jørgensen, 2015. "Active Labour Market Programme Participation for Unemployment Insurance Recipients: A Systematic Review," Campbell Systematic Reviews, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 1-342.
- Konle-Seidl, Regina, 2005. "Lessons learned: Internationale Evaluierungsergebnisse zu Wirkungen aktiver und aktivierender Arbeitsmarktpolitik," IAB-Forschungsbericht 200509, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
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