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Imperfect information, wage formation, and the employability of the unemployed

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Abstract

This paper considers the optimal hiring strategy of a firm that is unable to observe the productive abilities of all its applicants. Whom the firm considers as hireable, will depend crucially on the extent to which the firm can use its wage setting to mirror productivity differences. However, when setting its wages the firm has to consider other factors as well, e.g. turnover, that may make it optimal not to set wages that fully reflect productivity differences. Instead, it may be optimal to avoid hiring workers that have certain characteristics; i.e. to use a discriminatory hiring strategy. In the paper it is shown that discrimination based on employment status is an equilibrium hiring strategy even when the firm is free to set different wages for workers with different expected productivities. It is also shown that if all firms use such hiring procedures this will have strong implications for the aggregate economy and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Eriksson, Stefan, 2002. "Imperfect information, wage formation, and the employability of the unemployed," Working Paper Series 2002:17, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2002_017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Eriksson & Jonas Lagerström, 2006. "Competition between Employed and Unemployed Job Applicants: Swedish Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(3), pages 373-396, October.
    2. Stefan Eriksson, 2006. "Skill Loss, Ranking of Job Applicants and the Dynamics of Unemployment," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 7(3), pages 265-296, August.
    3. Jan Boone & Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund & Jan C. van Ours, 2007. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 399-421, March.
    4. Forslund, Anders & Gottfries, Nils & Westermark, Andreas, 2005. "Real and Nominal Wage Adjustment in Open Economies," Working Paper Series 2005:18, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    5. Eriksson, Stefan & Gottfries, Nils, 2005. "Ranking of job applicants, on-the-job search, and persistent unemployment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 407-428, June.
    6. Hämäläinen, Kari, 2003. "Education and Unemployment: State Dependence in Unemployment Among Young People in the 1990s," Discussion Papers 312, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Núria Rodríquez-Planas, 2011. "Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations," Working Papers 550, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. repec:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:265-296 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Nisar Ahmad, 2014. "State Dependence in Unemployment," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(1), pages 93-106.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hiring; imperfect information; discrimination; employed job seekers; efficiency wages; turnover; unemployment; welfare; policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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