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Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal Policy Choices?

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  • Chiara Dalle Nogare
  • Roberto Ricciuti

Abstract

According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiara Dalle Nogare & Roberto Ricciuti, 2008. "Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal Policy Choices?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2199, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2199
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    Cited by:

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    2. Toke S. Aidt & Julia Shvets, 2012. "Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 1-29, August.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Oriana Ponta, 2017. "Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(3), pages 289-321, March.

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