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Term limits at the local government level

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of the introduction of term limits at the local government level, using the Portuguese case as a natural experiment. Term limits became binding in the 2013 municipal elections, forcing 52% of the incumbent mayors to step down. The effects of this institutional change are studied using a differences-in-differences approach, on a sample comprising all Portuguese municipalities, from 1998 to 2013, and detailed data on local finances and municipal and mayor characteristics. The results indicate some benefits of term limits, such as the mitigation of the opportunistic manipulation of local finances, which has been more prevalent among more experienced eligible mayors.

Suggested Citation

  • Linda Gonçalves Veiga & Francisco veiga, 2016. "Term limits at the local government level," NIPE Working Papers 7/2016, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    • Handle: RePEc:nip:nipewp:7/2016
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    term limits; fiscal policy; local government; Portugal; natural experiment.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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