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Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government

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  • Sergio Bejar
  • Bumba Mukherjee
  • Will Moore

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  • Sergio Bejar & Bumba Mukherjee & Will Moore, 2011. "Time horizons matter: the hazard rate of coalition governments and the size of government," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 201-235, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:201-235
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-011-0096-0
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    2. Andres Velasco, 1999. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 37-58, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
    4. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., 1995. "What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 634-647, September.
    5. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    6. Mr. Vito Tanzi & Mr. Howell H Zee, 2001. "Tax Policy for Developing Countries," IMF Economic Issues 2001/001, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Cheibub, José Antonio & Przeworski, Adam & Saiegh, Sebastian M., 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 565-587, October.
    8. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Has Globalization Gone Too Far?," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 81-94, March.
    9. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521793797, October.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Özler, Sule & Roubini, Nouriel & Swagel, Phillip, 1996. "Political Instability and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 189-211, June.
    11. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    12. Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
    13. Brautigam,Deborah & Fjeldstad,Odd-Helge & Moore,Mick (ed.), 2008. "Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521888158, October.
    14. Przeworski,Adam & Alvarez,Michael E. & Cheibub,Jose Antonio & Limongi,Fernando, 2000. "Democracy and Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521790321, October.
    15. Bengt Holmström, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 169-182.
    16. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
    17. Fearon, James D. & Laitin, David D., 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 75-90, February.
    18. Howell H Zee & Vito Tanzi, 2001. "Tax Policy for Developing Countries," IMF Economic Issues 27, International Monetary Fund.
    19. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(2), pages 155-188, May.
    20. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    21. Alvarez, R. Michael & Garrett, Geoffrey & Lange, Peter, 1991. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 539-556, June.
    22. Poterba, James M. & von Hagen, Jurgen (ed.), 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226676234.
    23. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1.
    24. Sebastian M. Saiegh, 2009. "Coalition Governments And Sovereign Debt Crises," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 232-254, July.
    25. Warwick, Paul, 1992. "Economic Trends and Government Survival in West European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 875-887, December.
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    27. Brautigam,Deborah & Fjeldstad,Odd-Helge & Moore,Mick (ed.), 2008. "Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521716192, October.
    28. Keefer, Philip, 2004. "What does political economy tell us about economic development - and vice versa?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3250, The World Bank.
    29. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6159 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Kathleen Bawn & Frances Rosenbluth, 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 251-265, April.
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    2. Ali Akarca, 2018. "Political Determinants of Government Structure and Economic Performance in Turkey since 1950," Working Papers 1241, Economic Research Forum, revised 23 Oct 2018.

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