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Diagnosing and Mitigating Market Power in Chile’s Electricity Industry

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  • Arellano, M.S.

Abstract

This paper examines generators’ incentives to exercise market power and the strategies they would follow if all electricity supplies were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modelled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of generators’ strategic behaviour indicate that the largest (Endesa) would have the incentive and power to act unilaterally. It would schedule its hydro resources to take advantage of differences in price electricity: too little supply in high demand periods and too much in low demand periods. Two market power mitigation measures are analysed: requiring Endesa to divest some of its generating capacity, and fixed price forward contracts for dominant generators. Conditions for the development of a voluntary contract market are analysed, as it is not practical to rely permanently on vesting contracts imposed for the transition period.

Suggested Citation

  • Arellano, M.S., 2003. "Diagnosing and Mitigating Market Power in Chile’s Electricity Industry," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0327, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0327
    Note: CMI27, IO
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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep27.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
    2. Donatos, George S. & Mergos, George J., 1991. "Residential demand for electricity: The case of Greece," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 41-47, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Munoz, Francisco D. & Pumarino, Bruno J. & Salas, Ignacio A., 2017. "Aiming low and achieving it: A long-term analysis of a renewable policy in Chile," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 304-314.
    2. M. Pollitt, 2004. "Electricity reform in Chile. Lessons for developing countries," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 5(3), pages 221-263, September.
    3. Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam, 2018. "Market Power Modelling in Electricity Market: A Critical Review," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 8(5), pages 347-356.
    4. Dzikri Firmansyah Hakam & Sudarso Kaderi Wiyono & Nanang Hariyanto, 2020. "Competition in Power Generation: Ex-ante Analysis of Indonesia’s Electricity Market," Energies, MDPI, vol. 13(24), pages 1-20, December.
    5. Russell Pittman & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, 2010. "Electricity Restructuring In China: How Competitive Will Generation Markets Be?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 55(02), pages 377-400.
    6. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Electricity reform in Argentina: Lessons for developing countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1536-1567, July.
    7. SMEERS, Yves, 2005. "How well can one measure market power in restructured electricity systems ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Diaconu, Oana & Oprescu, Gheorghe & Pittman, Russell, 2009. "Electricity reform in Romania," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 114-124, March.
    9. Rego, Erik Eduardo & Parente, Virginia, 2013. "Brazilian experience in electricity auctions: Comparing outcomes from new and old energy auctions as well as the application of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch design," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 511-520.
    10. Hakam, Dzikri Firmansyah, 2019. "Mitigating the risk of market power abuse in electricity sector restructuring: Evidence from Indonesia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 181-191.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    electricity utilities; market power; scheduling hydro-reservoirs; contracts; Chile’s electricity industry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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