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Electricity Restructuring In China: How Competitive Will Generation Markets Be?

Author

Listed:
  • RUSSELL PITTMAN

    (Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, LSB 9446, Washington, DC 20530, USA;
    New Economic School, Nakhimovskii Prospekt 47, 117418, Moscow, Russia)

  • VANESSA YANHUA ZHANG

    (LECG, LLC, 33 W. Monroe Street, Suite 2300, Chicago, IL 60603, USA)

Abstract

The continuation of China's remarkable economic growth will depend on continued increases in electricity supply. China has commenced a program of electricity sector restructuring, with the announced aim of relying on markets and competition to provide incentives for attracting private investment and encouraging efficiency. However, a close examination of the generation markets being created suggests that truly free wholesale prices are likely to be both high and volatile. This may be the reason that these prices have not yet been freed — and it may not bode well for true market liberalization in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Pittman & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, 2010. "Electricity Restructuring In China: How Competitive Will Generation Markets Be?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 55(02), pages 377-400.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:serxxx:v:55:y:2010:i:02:n:s021759081000378x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021759081000378X
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Vanessa Yanhua & Chen, Yongjun, 2011. "Vertical relationships in China’s electricity industry: The quest for competition?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 142-151.
    2. Hang Gao & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, 2014. "Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 41-76, March.
    3. Rego, Erik Eduardo & Parente, Virginia, 2013. "Brazilian experience in electricity auctions: Comparing outcomes from new and old energy auctions as well as the application of the hybrid Anglo-Dutch design," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 511-520.
    4. Wisuttisak, Pornchai, 2012. "Regulation and competition issues in Thai electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 185-198.
    5. Rego, Erik Eduardo, 2013. "Reserve price: Lessons learned from Brazilian electricity procurement auctions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 217-223.
    6. Zhang, Yin-Fang & Gao, Ping, 2016. "Integrating environmental considerations into economic regulation of China's electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 62-71.
    7. Pittman, Russell, 2011. "Risk-averse restructuring of freight railways in China," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 152-160.
    8. Kuleshov, Dmitry & Viljainen, Satu & Annala, Salla & Gore, Olga, 2012. "Russian electricity sector reform: Challenges to retail competition," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 40-49.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity restructuring; competition; China; L94; O13; P28; Q48;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • P28 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Natural Resources; Environment
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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