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Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions

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  • Lauermann, Stephan
  • Nöldeke, Georg

    (University of Basel)

Abstract

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching models NEWLINE with search frictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014. "Existence of Steady-State Equilibria in Matching Models with Search Frictions," Working papers 2014/10, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2014/10
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adachi, Hiroyuki, 2003. "A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 182-198, December.
    2. Lones Smith, 2011. "Frictional Matching Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 319-338, September.
    3. Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-887, November.
    4. Lauermann, Stephan & Nöldeke, Georg, 2014. "Stable marriages and search frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 163-195.
    5. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    6. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
    7. Margaret Stevens, 2007. "New Microfoundations For The Aggregate Matching Function," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 847-868, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Safoura Moeeni, 2021. "Married women’s labor force participation and intra-household bargaining power," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1411-1448, March.
    2. Samuel Häfner & Georg Nöldeke, 2022. "Sorting in iterated incumbency contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1103-1140, November.
    3. Bester, Helmut, 2024. "Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 121-136.
    4. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Steady states in matching and bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 206-228.
    5. Manea, Mihai, 2017. "Bargaining in dynamic markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 59-77.
    6. Giovannetti, Andrea, 2021. "The anatomy of buyer–seller dynamics in decentralized markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Search; Matching; Bargaining; Steady-State Equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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