Report NEP-DES-2024-05-27

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Derek Neal & Joseph Root, 2024. "The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 32378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Alexander L. Brown & Daniel G. Stephenson & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2024. "Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanisms," Papers 2404.11883, arXiv.org.
• Cemil Selcuk, 2024. "Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions," Papers 2404.08762, arXiv.org.
• Günnur Ege Bilgin, 2024. "Decentralized Many-to-One Matching With Random Search," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_541, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Adam Kapor, 2024. "Transparency and Percent Plans," NBER Working Papers 32372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• E. Jason Baron & Richard Lombardo & Joseph P. Ryan & Jeongsoo Suh & Quitze Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024. "Mechanism Reform: An Application to Child Welfare," NBER Working Papers 32369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
• Mario Ghossoub & Giulio Principi & Ruodu Wang, 2024. "Allocation Mechanisms in Decentralized Exchange Markets with Frictions," Papers 2404.10900, arXiv.org.
• Bahel, Eric & Gómez-Rúa, María & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2024. "Merge-proofness and cost solidarity in shortest path games," MPRA Paper 120606, University Library of Munich, Germany.