Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds Suffice
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Callander, Steven, 2011. "Searching for Good Policies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 643-662, November.
- Horan, Sean Michael, 2021.
"Agendas in legislative decision-making,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(1), January.
- Sean HORAN, 2016. "Agendas in Legislative Decision-Making," Cahiers de recherche 02-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- HORAN, Sean, 2016. "Agendas in legislative decision-making," Cahiers de recherche 2016-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2022. "Deciding On What To Decide," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(1), pages 37-61, February.
- S. Nageeb Ali & B. Douglas Bernheim & Alexander W. Bloedel & Silvia Console Battilana, 2023. "Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(11), pages 3090-3128, November.
- Rosenthal, Howard & Zame, William R., 2022. "Sequential referenda with sophisticated voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983.
"Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170.
- Border, Kim C. & Jordan, J. S., "undated". "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity, and Phantom Voters," Working Papers 376, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
- Baron David & Kalai Ehud, 1993. "The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 290-301, December.
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
- Barberà, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2017. "Sequential voting and agenda manipulation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
- Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020.
"On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(4), pages 1059-1080, December.
- Bettina Klaus & Panos Protopapas, 2020. "On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness:median-voting over intervals," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 20.04, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Austen-Smith, David, 1987. "Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1323-1330, December.
- Bell, Colin E, 1981. "A Random Voting Graph Almost Surely Has a Hamiltonian Cycle When the Number of Alternatives Is Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1597-1603, November.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008.
"A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
- John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021.
"Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes,"
Working Papers
2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers halshs-03240630, HAL.
- Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000.
"Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January.
- Berga, D & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 353.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019.
"Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(2), pages 225-246, February.
- Mihir Bhattacharya, 2019. "Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains," Post-Print hal-02510491, HAL.
- Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008.
"Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2008. "Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication," Post-Print hal-00641865, HAL.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2008. "Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00641865, HAL.
- Pierre Fleckinger, 2008. "Bayesian Improvement of the Phantom Voters Rule: An example of Dichotomic Communication," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00641865, HAL.
- Bonifacio, Agustín G. & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Pablo, 2023.
"Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
- Agustín Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme, 2022. "Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains," Working Papers 121, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Agustín G Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme, 2022. "Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains," Working Papers 1324, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Stefan Maus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2006.
"Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 27-43, January.
- Maus, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2003. "Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets," Research Memorandum 029, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Régis Renault & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: the average vote example," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 497-513, December.
- Chatterjee, Swarnendu & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2016.
"Locating a public good on a sphere,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 46-48.
- Chatterjee, S. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2015. "Locating a public good on a sphere," Research Memorandum 028, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Nehring, Klaus & Puppe, Clemens, 2007. "The structure of strategy-proof social choice -- Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 269-305, July.
- Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
- Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sen, Arunava & Storcken, Ton, 2014.
"Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 123-127.
- Peters, H.J.M. & Roy, S. & Sen, A. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2013. "Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Lee, Barton E., 2022.
"Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
- Barton E. Lee, 2020. "Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling," Discussion Papers 2020-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002.
"Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
- Jeffrey S. Banks & John Duggan & Michel LeBreton, "undated". "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2010.
"The Condorcet Paradox Revisited,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
10-026/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2010. "The Condercet paradox revisited," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2013. "The Condorcet paradox revisited," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013.
"Quantifying parliamentary representation of constituents’ preferences with quasi-experimental data,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 170-180.
- David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2011. "Quantifying Parliamentary Representation of Constituents' Preferences with Quasi-Experimental Data," CREMA Working Paper Series 2011-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010.
"Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 761.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Individual versus group strategy proofedness: when do they coincide?," Working Papers 372, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- John A. Weymark, 2008.
"Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, February.
- John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-12-09 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MAC-2024-12-09 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MIC-2024-12-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2024-12-09 (Positive Political Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2410.20476. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.