Report NEP-DES-2024-12-09

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Edith Elkind & Ayumi Igarashi & Nicholas Teh, 2024. "Fair Division of Chores with Budget Constraints," Papers 2410.23979, arXiv.org.
• Ryoto Ando & Kei Kimura & Taiki Todo & Makoto Yokoo, 2024. "Parameterized Voter Relevance in Facility Location Games with Tree-Shaped Invitation Graphs," Papers 2411.05574, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
• Herings, P.J.J., 2024. "Expectational Equilibria and Drèze Equilibria in Many-to-one Matching Models," Other publications TiSEM 2818f6ae-f3b0-4b5e-9222-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
• Xinnian Kazusa Pan, 2024. "On the Equivalence of Synchronous Coordination Game and Asynchronous Coordination Design," Papers 2411.01879, arXiv.org.
• L'aszl'o Csat'o, 2024. "Most Swiss-system tournaments are unfair: Evidence from chess," Papers 2410.19333, arXiv.org.
• Federico Echenique & Quitz'e Valenzuela-Stookey, 2024. "Utilitarian Social Choice and Distributional Welfare Analysis," Papers 2411.01315, arXiv.org.
• Guanyi Wang, 2024. "Robust Network Targeting with Multiple Nash Equilibria," Papers 2410.20860, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
• Hofstetter, Reto & Lanz, Andreas & Sahni, Navdeep S., 2024. "Contract Design in Influencer Marketing," Research Papers 4184, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
• Hans Gersbach & Kremena Valkanova, 2024. "Voting with Random Proposers: Two Rounds Suffice," Papers 2410.20476, arXiv.org.