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Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness

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  • Zihao Li
  • Jonathan Libgober
  • Xiaosheng Mu

Abstract

A seller sells an object over time but is uncertain how the buyer learns their willingness-to-pay. We consider informational robustness under \textit{limited commitment}, where the seller offers a price \textit{each period} to maximize continuation profit against worst-case information arrival. Our formulation maintains dynamic consistency by considering the worst case \textit{sequentially}. Under general conditions, we characterize an essentially unique equilibrium where the buyer does not delay to learn more later. Furthermore, we identify a condition that ensures the equilibrium price path is ``reinforcing,'' so even dynamically inconsistent information arrival would not lower the seller's payoff below the equilibrium level.

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  • Zihao Li & Jonathan Libgober & Xiaosheng Mu, 2022. "Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness," Papers 2202.04616, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2202.04616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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